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RECONSIDERING STRICT SCRUTINY
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Brent E. Simmons*
In this Article, the author critiques the Supreme Court's recent rulings
applying strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review for raceconscious affirmative action programs. He contends that the Court's
"new and untested colorblindjurisprudence" is obstructing the national
consensus supportingaffirmative action measures to eliminate systemic
discriminationagainst minorities and women. To support his critique,
the authorfirst argues that the Supreme Court has taken onto itself ultimate responsibility and accountability for the success or failure of
ending systemic discrimination, a social policy objective that is more
properly the subject for legislative or executive resolution. Second, the
author points out how this new "colorblind" jurisprudence deviates
from prior, established equal protection doctrine grounded in the remedial objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment and Footnote 4 of United
States v. Carolene Products Co. Finally, the author examines the

practical effects of strict scrutiny under the Supreme Court's new colorblind jurisprudence. Specifically, he criticizes the Supreme Court's
and lower courts' inconsistentapplicationof strict scrutiny, and points
out the disruptive effect this has on otherwise legitimate government efforts to end systemic discrimination, that would probably survive
judicial scrutiny under a more balanced test.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional history is repeating itself. One hundred years
after adoption of its now discredited "separate but equal" doctrine in
Plessy v. Ferguson,' the U.S. Supreme Court is once again directing
the future course of race relations in the country.2 Just as it did more
than a century ago in overseeing the demise of Reconstruction, the
Supreme Court is obstructing yet another national consensus 3

1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court held that state laws requiring
"separate but equal" public accommodations for Blacks and Whites did not violate
the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Justice Harlan
accurately predicted in dissent, "[Tihe judgment this day rendered will, in time,
prove to be as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott
Case." Id. at 559.
2. See DAVID JUNG ET AL., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE COURTS (California Re-

search Bureau & Public Law Research Inst., Hastings College of Law, Report No.
CRB-LIS-96-001, Feb. 1996) <http://www.uchastings.edu/plri/fal195/aadoc.html>
("For some time, affirmative action has been debated in the political arena. Recent
United States Supreme Court decisions, however, have prompted some commentators to suggest that the future of affirmative action will be determined by the courts,
not the legislatures. That future, according to one view, is bleak." (citing Action:
Don't Forget the Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1995, at All)); see also Kenneth Jost, After
Adarand, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 70, 70 ("[T]he Supreme Court... [has] made it clear
that the future of affirmative action is more likely to be decided in the courts instead
of in the political arena.").
3. While controversial, opinion polls indicate that affirmative action generally has
enjoyed a solid core of bipartisan and popular support. See, e.g., Kenneth Jost, Rethinking Affirmative Action, 5 CQ RESEARCHER 369, 372, 374 (1995) (referring to a
March 1995 poll taken by the L.A. Times). Most Americans appear to support moderate forms of affirmative action-up to and including the use of goals and
timetables-but object to quotas. Id. at 374.
California Governor Pete Wilson attempted to make affirmative action a defining issue early in the 1996 presidential campaign. See Karen Brandon, Affirmative
Action Smoldering in '96: Efforts to Repeal Race- and Sex-Based Hiring PracticesRemain a
Volatile Political Issue, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 21, 1996, at G1. Campaigning legislators also moved affirmative action to the forefront of their agendas in Congress, as
well as in California and in other states. See id. In the final weeks before the November 1996 elections, however, the political campaign to end affirmative action was
largely abandoned. As one observer noted:
A year ago, the debate over affirmative action was turning bitter as Republicans in Congress and state legislatures across the country attacked the
issue, which seemed certain to become a decisive question in the 1996 presidential election ....
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supporting affirmative measures to eliminate systemic discrimination from American society. By narrow majorities, the Court has
meticulously laid the groundwork for a new and untested colorblind
jurisprudence,4 with the ultimate aim of invalidating government
use of race-conscious affirmative action as an instrument of public
policy in dismantling entrenched patterns of systemic discrimination' against minorities and women. As explained by the Clinton
Administration:
But heading into the final eight weeks of the presidential campaignand against all expectation-the affirmative action issue has virtually fallen
from view.
GOP leaders in Congress have abandoned [the Dole-Canady] bill that
would have rolled back most federal affirmative action programs. Outside of
California, . . . virtually every state legislative proposal launched in the past
year to eliminate or sharply curtail affirmative action has been unsuccessful.
Michael A. Fletcher, Losing Its Preference: Affirmative Action Fades as Issue,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1996, at A12. Mr. Fletcher also noted that affirmative action
continues to enjoy a "surprising amount of popular support" and that "some of the
nation's most prominent moderate Republicans have spoken out against efforts to
eliminate it." Id.
4. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 429 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1894
(1996) ("The whole thrust of the [Supreme] Court's description of the remanded
claim is to locate it within post-Croson "color-blind" Equal Protection jurisprudence,
in which strict scrutiny is triggered simply by the fact that legislation "classifies"
citizens by race-whatever its asserted purpose .... "). But as noted by Justice Brennan in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, "[N]o decision of this Court has
ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind." 438 U.S. 265,
336 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Along similar lines,
Andrew Kull has observed that
[t]he comfortable metaphor [of colorblindness] stands for an austere proposition: that American government is, or ought to be, denied the power to
distinguish between its citizens on the basis of race. A blanket prohibition of
racial classifications is impossible to locate in a literal reading of the constitutional text, and it has never been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as a
requirement of the "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet the color-blind idea persists nevertheless, forming a
seemingly indispensable theme in the constitutional law of race.
ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BUND CONSTITUTION 1 (1992).

5. The problem of systemic discrimination was first recognized by then-Vice
President Richard Nixon and the President's Committee on Government Contracts.
See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON GOV'T CONTRACTS, PATtERNS FOR PROGRESS: FINAL
REPORT TO PRESIDENT EISENHOwER (1960). As summarized by one scholar, the report
found that "the indifference of employers to establishing a positive policy of nondiscrimination hinders qualified applicants and employees from being hired and
promoted on the basis of equality." Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and the Interpretationof Its Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON
L. REv. 291,301-02 (1996).
[Furthermore, t]he Report demonstrated that even if overt discrimination did
not exist, a covert, societal type of discrimination flourished. This covert type
of discrimination had no malicious intent, but the effect still denied employment opportunities to African-Americans. Covert discrimination operates to
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The primary justification for the use of race- and genderconscious measures is to eradicate discrimination, root and
branch. Affirmative action, therefore, is used first and
foremost to remedy specific past and current discrimination or the lingering effects of past discrimination ....
Affirmative action is also used to prevent future discrimination or exclusion from occurring. It does so by ensuring
that organizations and decisionmakers end and avoid hiring or other practices that effectively erect barriers. 6
But a constitutional requirement of "colorblindness" would bar all
uses of racial classifications by state and local government, including
the use of race-conscious programs to end systemic discrimination.
perpetuate the status quo, and to retain discriminatory policies and practices.
...The problem is that [a] comfort level was achieved during a period when
African-Americans and other minorities were not welcomed, thereby excluding them from becoming part of the accepted norm. Therefore, in the
employment context, African-Americans were, and still are, excluded because
society wants to retain the comfort level, which manifests itself in what Vice
President Nixon referred to as "indifference." Though this is not overt discrimination, the effect is equally invidious.
Id.; see also James E. Jones, Jr., The Origins of Affirmative Action, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
383, 395 (1988) ("The implications of Nixon's report strongly suggest that [the report]
is the conceptual precursor of what is now referred to as institutional racism or
sexism-patterns of past discrimination built into institutional systems so they are
re-created without the necessity of malice."). Recent revelations concerning Texaco
and the report of the bipartisan Glass Ceiling Commission confirm the persistence of
systemic discrimination. See Maggie Jackson, Diversity Programs Fall Short in
Combating Corporate Racism, Associated Press, Nov. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL
4450172; Good for Business: Making Full Use of the Nation's Human Capital; FactFinding Report of the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
51, at S-1 (Supp. Mar. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Glass Ceiling Report].
6. Affirmative Action Review: Report to President Clinton, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 139, at S-1, S-4 (Supp. July 20, 1995) (emphasis omitted).
7. Cf. Louisiana Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669 So. 2d 1185 (La.
1996) (construing the state equal protection clause under LA. CONST. art. I, § 3, which
states: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations.").
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the clause affords "greater protection
than its federal counterpart"--to White males in this instance. Thus, "when a law
discriminates against a person by classifying him or her on the basis of race, it shall
be repudiated completely, regardless of the justification behind the racial discrimination." Id. at 1198 (emphasis added). Though racial classifications might be upheld
under Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny, the court said, "[T]here is no scrutiny
under Art. I, § 3" of the state constitution because racial classifications are absolutely
prohibited. Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court went on to reject arguments that: 1) the State
has "a constitutional duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in racepreference programs to cure the effects of past discrimination," and 2) adoption of
race-conscious programs is often a requirement for receipt of federal funds. See id. at
1199-1200. The court said that while the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes voluntary affirmative action by the State, it imposes no duty to adopt such programs. See
id. at 1199. Furthermore, the State is constitutionally bound to reject federal funds
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Such a requirement, however, is supported neither by the original
intent of the framers nor by the history of the Equal Protection
Clause. It would also represent a radical departure from fifty-eight
years of modem equal protection jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court began the process of reformulating equal
protection doctrine with its adoption of "strict scrutiny" in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.' There, for the first time, a majority of the
Court held that §overnment use of voluntarily adopted raceconscious remedies is presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that such programs
must be subjected to the same exacting scrutiny previously reserved
for invidious forms of racial discrimination. However, the need to
strictly scrutinize race-conscious remedial programs was neither
self-evident nor compelled by the Court's prior decisions."
For more than a decade after its 1978 decision in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke" the Court had been sharply divided
over the constitutional standard of review to be applied in affirmative action cases. 2 It was not until the 1989 decision in Croson that a
politically conservative, yet judicially "activist" majority 3 adopted
conditioned on the use of racial classifications. See id. at 1200. The court's ruling
raises a number of interesting federal constitutional issues which, unfortunately, lie
beyond the scope of the present Article.
8. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
9. The lower courts are still divided over whether strict scrutiny applies to genderbased affirmative action. Compare Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir.
1993) (applying strict scrutiny to gender-based affirmative action), with Coral Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting strict scrutiny
and applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based affirmative action). In United
States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the use of
intermediate or "skeptical scrutiny" for gender classifications in a non-affirmativeaction context.
10. See Parts IH.A-B of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2106-14 (1995).
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
12. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MiCH. L. REV. 1729, 1729 (1989).
13. Robert Glennon lays out well the distinction between political conservatism
and judicial conservatism:
[T]o understand the character of the Rehnquist Court, it is important to
distinguish between political conservatism and judicial conservatism....
Judicial restraint keynotes conservative judicialism.... Deference to
the other branches of government is a hallmark of judicial conservatism....
'.. [With the Rehnquist Court] we have the specter of politically conservative results and liberal judicial methods combined in an unusual fashion.
The character of the Rehnquist Court is not simply that case results serve
ideologically conservative ends. The methods used are frequently those of
judicial liberals.
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the standard of strict scrutiny for state and local government use of
race-conscious affirmative action.14 At the time, Croson sparked intense debate over its constitutional significance 5 and long-term
impact. 6 It is now clear that Croson was indeed a significant decision
and a crucial first step by the Court in effecting a fundamental
change in equal protection jurisprudence. As the U.S. Department of
Justice noted recently:
In the immediate aftermath of [the Croson decision], state
and local governments scaled back or eliminated altogether affirmative action programs that had been adopted
precisely to overcome discriminatory barriers to minority
opportunity and to correct for chronic underutilization of
minority firms. As a result of this retreat from affirmative
action, minority participation in state and local procurement plummeted quickly. 7
While the concern has been that "[an increasingly conservative
Court is likely to limit affirmative action to progressively narrower

Robert Glennon, Will the Real Conservatives Please Stand Up?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1990, at
49, 49-50; see also Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 315-16 (1991) ("[T]he Court's recent hostility toward
affirmative action [as well as its adoption of strict scrutiny for minority racial preferences] ... seems inconsistent with the strict constructionist constitutional philosophy
that many of the Justices purport to espouse.").
Under a "strict constructionist interpretation [of] the legislative intent of [the
Fourteenth Amendment and] civil rights laws, the Supreme Court should affirm the
underlying rationale for affirmative action programs and return to a more lenient
level of scrutiny when analyzing these programs." Brody, supra note 5, at 292-93
(citation omitted).
14. Voluntary affirmative action by private employers is subject to somewhat less
rigorous standards under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994). In general, a private employer must demonstrate: 1) a manifest imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories; 2) that the affirmative action plan will not
unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-targeted groups, nor benefit unqualified
individuals; and 3) that the plan is temporary, flexible, and is not designed simply to
maintain a racially balanced workforce. See generally 29 C.F.R. pt. 1608 (1995) (laying
out the EEOC's guidelines on affirmative action).
15. See, e.g., Joint Statement, ConstitutionalScholars' Statement on Affirmative Action
After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989); Charles Fried,
Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989); Scholars' Reply to Professor Fried, 99 YALE L.J.
163 (1989).
16. For example, one scholar remarked, "[A]lthough it is certainly too early to
assess the full impact of Croson, the clear change in direction signaled by the holding
in Croson seems likely to strike a major blow against long-standing, concerted efforts to
narrow the economic gap between black and white entrepreneurs." Rosenfeld, supra note
12, at 1731 (emphasis added).
17. Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg.
26,041 app. at 26,062 (1996) (proposed May 23, 1996).
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circumstances, and perhaps, to prohibit it entirely,"'8 the application
of strict scrutiny by lower court judges has been the principal driving force toward a per se ban on race-conscious affirmative action.
Under the guise of strictly scrutinizing affirmative action programs,
lower court judges are declaring with increasing frequency that only
race-neutral means may be employed in remedying systemic discrimination. 9
Another key premise of the Court's new colorblind jurisprudence is that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals, rather
than groups. 2° As a consequence, an individual White male may successfully challenge a race- or gender-based affirmative action
program in employment, even though White males as a group may
be overrepresented in the workforce as a result of the very historic
and systemic discrimination that the affirmative action program is

18. George Rutherglen, After Affirmative Action: Conditions and Consequences of
Ending Preferences in Employment, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 340.
19. For example, in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), reh 'g en banc denied, 84
F.3d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996), the Fifth Circuit declared that
any consideration of race in university admissions was per se invalid. The court said
that the government's use of race "undercuts the ultimate goal of the Fourteenth
Amendment: the end of racially-motivated state action." 78 F.3d at 947-48. In Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995), the
Fourth Circuit reaffirmed an earlier declaration "that race is an impermissible arbiter
of human fortunes." 38 F.3d at 152.
20. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). But as Justice
Marshall stated in his dissent in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke:
[Ilt is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based
discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a classbased remedy for that discrimination is permissible. In declining to so hold,
today's judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred years Negroes
have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely because
of the color of their skins.
438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It has also been noted that:
[Dliscrimination is not, contrary to the premise of the nondiscrimination
principle, against individuals. It is discrimination against a people. And the
remedy, therefore, has to correct and cure and compensate for the discrimination against the people and not just the discrimination against the
identifiable persons....
•.. [Tihe policy of limiting remedies to individually identified victims
of racial discrimination is neither compelled nor justified by constitutional
considerations. The equal protection clause is not primarily concerned with
the protection of individuals against invidious discrimination. On the contrary, it cannot sensibly be interpreted in any other way than... in terms of
its protection of groups, and of individuals only by reason of their membership in groups.
Burke Marshall, A Comment on the NondiscriminationPrinciple in a "Nation of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006, 1006-07 (1984).
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intended to correct. Moreover, individual White male plaintiffs can
challenge affirmative action programs without demonstrating actual
personal injury. It is enough to assert that race- or gender-based affirmative action by the government "discriminates" against them on
the basis of their group status,2' even though they are not divested of
any existing rights.2
To contend, however, that strict scrutiny of affirmative action is
required simply because race is involved only begs the question.
Prior to Croson, it was by no means self-evident that stringent judicial scrutiny was warranted, or even appropriate, in reviewing the
remedial use of racial and gender classifications in governmentsponsored programs. Indeed, it was not until the mid-1960s that the
Court first "espoused the notion that racial classifications were presumptively unconstitutional."23 Throughout the entire contentious
21. See, e.g., Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v.
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) ("To establish standing... a party challenging a set-aside program... need only demonstrate that it is able and ready to bid
on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on an equal
basis.").
22. Some observers contend that the Supreme Court's preoccupation with the
rights of White males is premised on the notion of "White entitlement"-i.e., the
view that the Equal Protection Clause elevates the "established expectations" of
White males over group-based remedies aimed at eliminating discrimination in the
status quo. See Lia A. Fazzone, Raise High the Roof Beam: Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena and the New Level of Scrutinyfor FederalAffirmative Action, 73 DENy. U. L. REV.
599, 601 n.19 (1996). As Anthony Lewis recently noted: "Black Americans may be
excused if they see a certain hypocrisy in the sudden zeal for equal protection on
behalf of whites." Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Down the River, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
1996, at A23.
23. Klarman, supra note 13, at 220. Klarman argues that up until the mid-1960s,
the Supreme Court never held that government use of racial classifications were
subject to strict scrutiny because they were presumptively invalid. See id. at 214, 220.
Klarman maintains, instead, that only racial classifications affecting fundamental
rights received heightened scrutiny. See id. at 235-39. All other racial classifications
were deemed presumptively valid, as long as they were not irrational or arbitrary. As
Klarman notes, "the dominant intention of the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters...
had been to protect blacks in the exercise of certain fundamental rights, rather than
to proscribe all racial classifications." Id. at 220. Indeed, that interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment was supported by the dominant nineteenth-century view
that it did not prohibit racial segregation in the schools or other public accommodations, nor did it invalidate laws against interracial marriages. While such laws
employed racial classifications, the rights affected were not viewed as fundamental.
Klarman goes on to argue that neither Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), nor the Court's earlier decisions in the Japanese curfew and internment
cases-Hirabayashiv. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944)-were premised on the rule that racial classifications were presumptively invalid. See Klarman, supra note 13, at 232, 246-47. In each instance,
Klarman explains, the level of scrutiny turned on the importance of the right involved. On the other hand, he contends that "the full Court first stated a presumptive
rule against racial classifications in McLaughlin v. Florida,379 U.S. 184 (1964), where
it struck down on equal protection grounds a state law criminalizing cohabitation by
unmarried interracial couples." Klarman, supra note 13, at 255.
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history of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has vacillated on both the extent to which state government may use racial
and gender classifications and the corresponding level of judicial
scrutiny to be applied. 4
In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the Equal Protection Clause "was virtually strangled in infancy by post-Civil War
judicial reactionism. '' The Supreme Court refused to invoke the
Fourteenth Amendment as a constitutional shield against the political compromising of minority rights. 6 In the final decade of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court is once again commanding a
retreat from the full promise of the Fourteenth Amendment. Much
like the sentiments expressed by Justice Bradley in 1883, the Court
today seems to have concluded that minorities and women must
cease "to be the special favorite[s] of the law," having now attained
the rank of "mere citizen."27 With its adoption of strict scrutiny, the
Court has all but declared government-sponsored, race-conscious
affirmative action to be per se invalid.28 Yet, the Court continues to
acknowledge that the playing field is not level, that "[tihe unhappy

24. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding "separate but
equal" under rational review), and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872)
(upholding a state's refusal to admit women to the practice of law under rational
review), with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying
strict scrutiny to racial classifications), and United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications).
25. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J.) (quoting
Joseph Tussman & Jacob tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341,381 (1949)).
26. Robert Cover has written that:
The Slaughter-HouseCases, to prevent the fourteenth amendment from being a
comprehensive source of rights against the state, made use of the common
knowledge that the [Civil War] Amendments were designed to ameliorate the
condition of Blacks.
This view of constitutional law and history did perceive Negroes as a
special object of protection... [and] might have proven the starting point for
articulating a special judicial role in protecting minorities, or at least in protecting the most important minority in American experience. But an
observation about the purpose of a constitutional text is not... a theory about
the role of the judiciary.... [T]he massive retreat from protecting Black rights
between the 1870's and the 1920's-a retreat led by the Court in many instances-eliminated any chance of inferring such a role from practice....
[Tihe explicit articulation of a special judicial role with respect to minorities
and their rights awaited the constitutional reconstruction of 1937-38.
Robert M. Cover, The Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protectionof Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1295 (1982) (referring to United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
27. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,25 (1883).
28. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination ...is an unfortunate reality." 29
One hundred years after Plessy v. Ferguson,3° an activist Court is
again second-guessing and voiding legislatively approved policies
to end pervasive and systemic discrimination against minorities and
women. 31 Clearly, "[sltrict scrutiny is inappropriately applied to benign racial classifications intended to remedy our nation's
deplorable history of racial discrimination. 32 Its application "under
the pretext of advancing a color-blind Constitution" perpetrates a
"grave injustice. 33 Strict scrutiny of affirmative action disrupts public policies both to end systemic discrimination and to generally
improve race relations within the context of equal opportunity.
"The alternative to affirmative action is not a utopia of meritocracy blind to race and gender, but a continuation of the old regime

29. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
30. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
31. Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
wrote:
I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil War our Government
started several "affirmative action" programs. This Court in the Civil Rights
Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement toward complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken, and this nonaction was with the
tacit approval of the courts. Then we had Brown v. Board of Education and the
Civil Rights Acts of Congress, followed by numerous affirmative action programs. Now, we have this Court again stepping in, this time to stop
affirmative action programs of the type used by the University of California.
438 U.S. 265, 402 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1169 (6th Cir. 1994) (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge Jones went on to state:
The Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to impose an absolute standard of color blindness upon our law to the extent that such a standard
becomes a bar to the achievement of the purposes of the amendment....
...Review of these plans under a strict scrutiny standard routinely results in the invalidation of plans which are designed to achieve the vital goal
of remedying our nation's history of discrimination. Such an application is
clearly antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, applying strict
scrutiny to the benign use of race-conscious affirmative action, which seeks to
alter employment patterns shaped by past racial discrimination, comes perilously close to nullifying the amendment as it pertains to persons of color.

Id. at 1172-73; see also Brody, supra note 5, at 325 ("The application of strict scrutiny to
a program under review is, of course, nearly fatal in fact, and does not serve the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, by applying strict
scrutiny, the Court prevents the Equal Protection Clause from achieving its intended
purpose.").
33. Aiken, 37 F.3d at 1172 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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of societal preferences." Study after study confirms that systemic
discrimination on the basis of race and gender remains a problem in
5 Following a detailed survey of congressional
many areas of society.3
findings, state and local disp7arity studies, and a variety of economic
reports on discrimination, the Justice Department has concluded

34. Gerald W. Heaney, The Political Assault on Affirmative Action: Undermining
Forty Years of Progress Toward Equality, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 119, 132 (1996); see
also Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1013 (1993) (discussing
how race neutrality perpetuates the inequitable status quo).
35. For example, the bipartisan Glass Ceiling Commission made the following
findings on the "glass ceiling" phenomenon:
The term "glass ceiling" first entered America's public conversation ...
when The Wall Street Journal's "Corporate Woman" column identified a puzzling new phenomenon. There seemed to be an invisible-but impenetrablebarrier... preventing [women] from reaching the highest levels of the business world regardless of their accomplishments and merits.... The metaphor
was quickly extended.., to obstacles hindering the advancement of minority
men, as well as women.
The Glass Ceiling Act was enacted.., as Title H of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. It established the bipartisan [21-member] Glass Ceiling Commission,
with the Secretary of Labor as its chair....
The factfinding report that the Commission is now releasing confirms
the enduring aptness of the "glass ceiling" metaphor. At the highest levels of
business, there is indeed a barrier only rarely penetrated by women or persons of color. Consider: 97% of the senior managers of Fortune 1000 industrial
and Fortune 500 companies are white; 95 to 97% are male....
The research also indicates that where there are women and minorities
in high places, their compensation is lower. For example, African American
men with professional degrees earn 79% of the amount earned by white
males who hold the same degrees and are in the same job categories. One
study found that, more than a decade after they had graduated from the Stanford University Business School, men were eight times more likely to be
CEO's than women.
Nor does the evidence indicate that the glass ceiling is a temporary
phenomenon.... [Rielatively few women and minorities [are] in the positions
most likely to lead to the top[, and instead are occupying] ... staff positions,
such as human resources, or research, or administration, rather than line positions, such as marketing, or sales, or production....
In short, the factfinding report tells us that the world at the top of the
corporate hierarchy does not yet look anything like America. Two-thirds of
our population, and 57 percent of the working population, is female, or minorities, or both....
Glass Ceiling Report, supra note 5 (message from Secretary of Labor and Glass Ceiling Commission chairperson Robert B. Reich); see also JARED BERNSTEIN, ECONOMIC
POUCY INST., WHERE'S THE PAYOFF? THE GAP BETWEEN BLACK ACADEMIC PROGRESS
AND EcoNoMIc GAINS (1995) (finding that the wage gap between Black males and

White males actually increasedwith more education).
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that "in the absence of affirmative remedial efforts, federal contracting would unquestionably reflect the continuing impact of
discrimination that has persisted over an extended period. '3 7
Race and gender discrimination spans the socioeconomic spectrum. In fact, the effects of discrimination may be more pronounced
at the top of the economic ladder, where the power, prestige, and
monetary stakes are at their greatest. 3 Though often related, discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage present distinct
problems that require distinct solutions. Limiting affirmative action
to "social and economic disadvantage," as some have proposed,39
would not effectively address the "glass ceiling" ° phenomenon.
While minorities and women in corporate management suffer no
economic disadvantage, too often they are still the victims of race
and gender discrimination.
As the U.S. Civil Rights Commission explains:
When [discriminatory] processes are at work, antidiscrimination remedies that insist on "color blindness" or
"gender neutrality" are insufficient. Such efforts may control certain prejudiced conduct, but measures that take no
conscious account of race, sex, or national origin often
prove ineffective against processes that transform
"neutrality" into discrimination. In such circumstances, the
only effective remedy is affirmative action, which responds
as a self-sustaining process and dismanto discrimination
41
tles it.

36. A summary of the Justice Department's survey is appended to its Proposed
Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,041 app. at
26,050-62 (1996) (proposed May 23, 1996).
37. Id. at 26,042.
38. This phenomenon is confirmed by the Glass Ceiling and Bernstein Reports.
Glass Ceiling Report, supra note 5; BERNSTEIN, supra note 35.
39. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
40. For a discussion of this terminology, see supra note 35 (quoting the Glass
Ceiling Report).
41. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s: DISMANTLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 2 (Clearinghouse Publication No. 70,
1981). Moreover, the Department of Justice has observed that:
Congress also has attempted to redress the problems facing minority businesses through race-neutral assistance to all small businesses. Congress has
determined, however, that those remedies, by themselves, are "ineffectual in
eradicating the effects of past discrimination," and that race-conscious measures are a necessary supplement to race-neutral ones.
Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. app.
at 26,053 (citations omitted).
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Under the artificial constraints of strict scrutiny, however, the courts
are free to veto the government's choice of more effective, raceconscious means. The Supreme Court's unfortunate and illconceived adoption of strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard
for reviewing race-conscious affirmative action should be reconsidered for several reasons.
First, comprehensive remedies for historic and systemic discrimination against minorities and women are proper subjects for
legislative and executive-rather than judicial-resolution. In
strictly reviewing policy determinations by the politically accountable branches of government, the courts have exceeded their proper
constitutional role. The Supreme Court's rejection of "societal discrimination" as a basis for remedial action by government" simply
underscores the inappropriateness of applying strict scrutinywithin the context of individual "reverse discrimination" claims-to
broadly based social policies.
Second, even assuming certain constitutional limits on the use
of race-conscious affirmative action, the use of strict scrutiny to create a "colorblind jurisprudence" displaces more than half a century
of settled equal protection doctrine.
Third, the inconsistent application of strict scrutiny by state and
federal courts43 has undermined legitimate efforts to dismantle systemic discrimination in public employment, contracting, and higher
education.
I. STRICT SCRUTINY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
HAS THE SUPREME COURT OVERSTEPPED ITS ROLE?

Generally, state and federal agencies have adopted affirmative
action programs in response to perceived discrimination. There is,
however, widespread misunderstanding about the use of affirmative
action as government policy4-what it is, how it operates, whom it
benefits, and whether it is necessary, given laws prohibiting virtually all forms of discrimination. The U.S. Commission on Civil

42. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy."). On the other hand, Justice O'Connor wrote in City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co. that "Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide
discrimination," though that did not mean states and their political subdivisions
were free to remedy such discrimination. 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (O'Connor, J.).
43. See discussion infra Part II.A.
44. " 'Affirmative action' enjoys no clear and widely shared definition. This contributes to the confusion and miscommunication surrounding the issue." Affirmative
Action Review: Report to President Clinton, supra note 6, at S-3 n.1.
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Rights has issued several statements explaining the concept of affirmative action.i
A. Affirmative Action Defined
In Affirmative Action in the 1980s: Dismantling the Process of Discrimination,46 the United States Commission on Civil Rights stated:
Affirmative action has no meaning outside the context of
discrimination, the problem it was created to remedy.
All too often, discussions of affirmative action first divorce this remedy from the historic and continuing
problem of discrimination against minorities and women.
Such discussions then debate the merits of particular
measures that take race, sex, and national origin into account-such as goals and quotas-without any agreement
upon or consistent reference to the discriminatory conditions that can make such remedies necessary. This
statement .

.

. continually ties the remedy of affirmative

action to the problem of discrimination with a "problemremedy" approach. Without agreement about the forms
and scope of race, sex, and national origin discrimination,
agreement about appropriate remedies is difficult, if not
impossible. Our starting point, therefore, is not affirmative
action, but race, sex and national origin discrimination.
As the title of this statement suggests, the Commission
views discrimination against minorities and women as
processes that will continue unless systematically dismantled. 47
Furthermore, as explained by the Commission's Office of General
Counsel:
Affirmative action is a contemporary term that encompasses any measure, beyond simple termination of a
discriminatory practice, that permits the consideration of
race, national origin, sex, or disability, along with other

45. See Briefing Paper for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: Legislative, Executive & Judicial Development of Affirmative Action, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.

64, at E-2 (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Briefing Paper]; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 41; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(Clearinghouse Publication No. 54,1977).
46. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 41.
47. Id. at 1-2.
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criteria, and which is adopted to provide opportunities to a
class of qualified individuals who have either historically
or actually been denied those opportunities and/or to
prevent the recurrence of discrimination in the future."
Thus, affirmative action is used primarily-though not exclusively-as a remedy for identified discrimination.49 Additionally, it
addresses systemic, as opposed to individual instances of, discrimination. The objective is twofold: first, eliminating the effect of prior
discrimination, usually reflected in the underutilization of minorities
and/or women; and second, preventing future discrimination by
identifying and eliminating exclusionary practices or processes, such
as the use of "old boy networks" or stereotypical assumptions about
the abilities of qualified minorities and women.
B. The Evolution ofAffirmative Action as a Federal Policy
The use of affirmative action by the federal government
evolved over a period of three decades. First, it was necessary to
pressure the government into simply declaring a policy of
"nondiscrimination" in government-related industries, and by government contractors. Capitulating to a threatened March on
Washington by A. Phillip Randolph and 100,000 African American
men,' President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 on June 25,
1941."' The Order prohibited employment discrimination by the federal government, defense related industries, and federal
contractors. 52 The policy was to be reviewed by a five-member Fair
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC).53 However, many questioned the legitimacy of the FEPC's authority, and it was

48. Briefing Paper, supra note 45, at E-2.
49. The Supreme Court has also upheld the nonremedial use of affirmative action
in certain contexts, such as the promotion of a compelling interest in diversity. See,
e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (noting that the diversity of a police force contributes to effective law enforcement); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding that universities have protected First Amendment interest in diversified student body for educational purposes). But see Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), reh 'g en banc denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2580 (1996), (rejecting Justice Powell's recognition in Bakke of a "compelling interest"
in educational diversity that would permit consideration of race as "a factor" in university admissions).
50. See, e.g., MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLYMENT 9(1966).
51. Exec. Order No. 8802,3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943).
52. See 3 C.F.R. 957.
53. See 3 C.F.R. 957.
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strenuously opposed by Southern Democrats in Congress.s4 It also
lacked adequate staffing, funding, and enforcement powers." As a
result, the federal ban against employment discrimination in the defense industry and by federal contractors was never effectively
enforced during the 1940s and 1950s. 6
Recognizing that it was not enough to simply prohibit discrimination in employment, President Kennedy issued Executive
Order 10,925 on March 6, 1961, directing federal contractors to "take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, creed, color, or national origin., 7 The President's Committee
on Equal Employment Oportunity was established to investigate
and resolve complaints. Again, however, the new Committee
lacked adequate enforcement power. Moreover, the Order failed to
specify the kind of "affirmative action" federal contractors were expected to take to ensure compliance. Nor were there any reporting
or monitoring procedures to measure compliance.
Congress finally became involved with passage of Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,9 outlawing employment discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Act also
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, with full
enforcement powers. To secure passage of Title VII, however, sponsors of the legislation had to make it clear that the law did not
require "quotas." Thus, § 703(j) was added:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted
to require any employer.., to grant preferential treatment to
any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed . . . in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons
of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .in
the available work force.W

54. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 11-12 (1990); SOVERN, supra note 50, at 12.

55. See GRAHAM, supra note 54, at 10-11; SOVERN, supra note 50, at 11-13.
56. For an excellent history of the FEPC and the subsequent development of effective administrative enforcement of equal employment opportunity, see GRAHAM,
supra note 54; SOVERN, supra note 50.

57. Exec. Order No. 10,925,3 C.F.R. 448,450 (1959-1963).
58. See 3 C.F.R. at 451-52.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (emphasis added). Senator Hubert H. Humphrey gave
the following explanation for the inclusion of § 703(j):
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The authors of the California Civil Rights Initiative 61Proposition 209-cite § 7030) as the source of the Proposition's ban
on "preferential treatment" in public employment, contracting, and
higher education. 6 They contend that § 703(j)'s ban on preferential
treatment includes voluntary affirmative action. However, that interpretation of § 7030) was flatly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court
in United Steelworkers v. Weber.
In Weber, the Court observed that while § 7030) does not require
affirmative action, neither does it prohibit "voluntary, private, raceconscious affirmative action efforts to abolish traditional patterns of
racial segregation and hierarchy."' Moreover, the Court continued,

[Slubsection 703(j) is added to deal with the problem of racial balance among
employees. The proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions that title VII does not require an employer to achieve any sort of racial
balance in his work force by giving preferential treatment to any individual
or group. Since doubts have persisted, subsection (j) is added to state this
point expressly.
110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964).
61. State senators Quentin Kopp, Tom Campbell, and Bill Leonard introduced
Proposition 209, also known as California Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 10,
§ 31(a), on February 17, 1995. See Ann Bancroft, Senate Committee Kills Key Affirmative
Action Bill, Associated Press Pol. Service, Mar. 28, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6717360.
According to the terms of the Proposition:
Neither the State nor any of its political subdivisions or agents shall use race,
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion for either discriminating
against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual or group in the
operation of the State's system of public employment, public education, or
public contracting.
E.g., Rick D. Martinez, Affirmative Action Ushered in Equality-and Government Racism,
ARIZ. REPUBuC, Mar. 5, 1995, at F3 (quoting language from Proposition 209). California residents approved Proposition 209 on November 5, 1996. See, e.g., Carol Ness
& Annie Nakao, Opponents File Suit to Block Prop. 209; Voters Back Ban on Affirmative
Action by 55-45 Percent, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 6, 1996, at Al. It was immediately challenged in federal court. See id. (referring to the recently filed case, Coalition for
Economic Equity v. Wilson). On November 27, 1996, the district court issued a temporary restraining order barring enforcement of Proposition 209. See, e.g., Reynolds
Holding, Judge Blocks Proposition 209, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 28, 1996, at Al. The court
said that the Proposition "probably" violates the Equal Protection Clause, in light of
Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). See id.
62. The Initiative was first drafted by anthropology professor Glynn Custred of
California State University, and former philosophy professor Tom Wood, who is
now executive director of the California Association of Scholars. See Jost, supra note
3, at 386. They say the Initiative will eliminate "affirmative discrimination" and will
restore Title VII's original ban on "preferential treatment." See id.
63. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
64. Id. at 204-06 (comparing § 703(j) with respondents' § 703(a), (d) claims). In
Weber, the United Steelworkers and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation entered into a collective bargaining agreement, under which 50% of in-plant crafttraining programs would be reserved for Black employees, so as to eliminate racial
imbalance in Kaiser's historically segregated, virtually all-White craftwork forces.
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Congress intended Title VII to operate "as a spur or catalyst to cause
'employers and unions to self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible,
the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this
country's history.' "'" Furthermore, the Court has recognized that
"Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the preferred means
H " in both private and public
of achieving the objectives of Title VII
67
employment.
Following enactment of Title VII in 1964, President Johnson
took affirmative action one step further by issuing Executive Order
11,246 in 1965." Not only did Executive Order 11,246 prohibit employment discrimination and require government contractors to take
affirmative steps to hire minorities (and later, women), it also imposed requirements: first, to determine if minorities and women are
being underutilized; second, if so, actually to develop and implement written affirmative action plans; and third, to submit periodic
"compliance" reports.70 Where qualified minorities and women are
underrepresented, a federal contractor's affirmative action plan
must include "goals and timetables" for achieving a representative
workforce.

See id. at 197-98. Several White employees challenged the voluntary agreement as a
violation of § 703. See id. at 199-200.
65. 443 U.S. at 204 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 U.S. 405, 418
(1975)).
66. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515
(1986).
67. As the EEOC's policy statement on affirmative action sets forth:
There is ample evidence in all sectors of our society that such equal access
frequently has been denied to members of certain groups because of their sex,
racial, or ethnic characteristics....
... [V]igorous enforcement of the laws against discrimination is essential. But equally, and perhaps even more important are affirmative, voluntary
efforts on the part of public employers to assure that positions in the public
service are genuinely and equally accessible to qualified persons, without regard to their sex, racial, or ethnic characteristics....

As with most management objectives, a systematic plan based on
sound organizational analysis and problem identification is crucial to the accomplishment, of affirmative action objectives. For this reason, the [Equal
Employment Opportunity Coordinating] Council urges all State and local
governments to develop and implement results oriented affirmative action
plans which deal with the problems so identified.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.17 (1995).
68. Exec. Order No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965).
69. Revised Order No. 4, codified at 41 C.F.R. § 60-2, now includes both "minority
groups" and "women" within the scope of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs' Affirmative Action Programs. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1996).
70. 3 C.F.R. at 340-41.
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Going even further, President Nixon issued Executive Order
11,4787 in 1969 requiring federal agencies to establish affirmative
action programs for civilian employees. That same year, the
Department of Labor set specific numeric targets or "quotas" for
funded construction projects under the "Philadelphia
federally
,7
Plan.

In the wake of Adarand, the Clinton Administration has reaffirmed the executive branch's commitment to continued
enforcement of federal affirmative action programs. Following a
five-month study, the Administration concluded that federal affirmative action programs and requirements had been effective in
remedying systemic discrimination and in creating equal opportunity for minorities and women. A Presidential Memorandum for
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, dated July 19, 1995,
declares in part:
This Administration will continue to support affirmative
measures that promote opportunities in employment, education, and government contracting for Americans subject
to discrimination or its continuing effects.... [T]he Federal
Government will continue to support lawful consideration
of race, ethnicity, and gender under programs that are
flexible, realistic, subject to reevaluation, and fair.74
The Memorandum goes on to state that specific programs must be
eliminated or reformed if they create quotas, preferences for unm In addition,
qualified individuals, or reverse discrimination.7
programs must be eliminated if their equal opportunity purposes
have been achieved. 76 Federal agencies are directed to evaluate their
affirmative action programs to ensure compliance with Adarand, and

71. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970).
72. See Jones, supra note 5, at 399-402.
73. In an address to the nation on July 19, 1995, President Clinton cited historically
bipartisan support for affirmative action, noting that affirmative action has not been
the cause of middle-class economic woes. See Remarks at the National Archives and
Records Administration, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1255, 1256, 1261 (July 19,
1995). He stated that while some programs were in need of reform, the basic approach to affirmative action should be to "[m]end it, don't end it." Id. at 1263. He
also declared that "affirmative action has been good for America," id. at 1263, and
that "[iut is simply wrong to play politics with the issue of affirmative action and
divide our country," id. at 1261. This sentiment seems particularly appropriate at a
time when we need to unite the country to prepare every American for global competition.
74. Id. at 1264.
75. See id. at 1265.
76. See id.
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to reform or eliminate any program that does not meet the constitutional standard. 77
Thus, both the effectiveness and the continuing need for
affirmative action to eliminate systemic discrimination against minorities and women have been established. But while the Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of race- and gender-based
affirmative action in theory, strict scrutiny has given the courts the
power to veto implementation of legitimate affirmative action
programs.
C. The ConstitutionalBases of Race-Conscious Remedies
A number of commentators have pointed out that the Court's
"race-neutral" or "colorblind" view of the Equal Protection Clause is
plainly inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's original remedial objectives. 78 Just five years after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment-with the legislative history still fresh in its mind-the
Supreme Court observed that the "one pervading purpose" of the
Civil War Amendments was "the freedom of the slave race,

. . .

and

[the] firm establishment of that freedom."79 The Court went on to
explain:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in
this protection.... But what we do say ...is, that in any

fair and just construction of ... these amendments, it is
necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was
the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to
the Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutionallaw can accomplish it.,"
Providing even greater insight into the specific remedial purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court also said, "We doubt very
much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar & Lisa F. Opoku, Justice O'Connor's Blind Rationali-

zation of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence-AdarandConstructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097 (1995), 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 240 (1996); Brody, supra note 5, at
334; Patricia A. Carlson, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Lochnerization of
Affirmative Action, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 423, 447 (1996); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754

(1985); see also Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1172 (6th Cir. 1994) (Jones, J.,
dissenting) ("The Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to impose an absolute
standard of color blindness upon our law to the extent that such a standard becomes
a bar to the achievement of the purposes of the amendment.").
79. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873).

80. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
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discriminationagainst the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision."81
The Reconstruction-Era Court in the Slaughter-House Cases
clearly contemplated "group-based" remedies under the Equal Protection Clause for the specific benefit of African Americans "as a
class." Also anticipating "reverse discrimination" claims by White
males, the Court indicated that such claims would not fall within the
"purview" of the Amendment's remedial protections-that is, reverse discrimination did not specifically involve "discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race." 82 Clearly,
the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in the
Slaughter-House Cases was anything but "race-neutral" or
"colorblind."
By contrast, the present Court has a very different view of the
equal protection guarantee:
[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups. It follows from that
principle that all governmental action based on race-a
group classification long recognized as "in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited"-should be
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry.... These ideas have
long been central to this Court's understanding of equal
protection, and holding "benign" state and federal racial
classifications to different standards does not square with
them.
But consider the classic and perhaps most familiar example of raceconscious, group-based affirmative action under the Fourteenth
Amendment: the desegregation of public schools by the judicial
branch itself. School desegregation is quintessentially a systemic,
race-conscious, and group-based process-a process that continues
forty-two years after Brown v. Board of Education." School

81. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (citation
omitted).
84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Linda Gibson, Judge: 37 Years of School Case Is
Enough, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1996, at A10 ("Throughout the country, as many as 400
school districts still are wrangling with legal issues stemming from desegregation
lawsuits first filed in the mid-'50s to late '60s, according to lawyers with the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.").
While the courts have played a crucial part in the dismantling of systemic discrimination, it is also clear that litigation is an expensive and time-consuming
method of achieving social change. Yet, strict scrutiny of legislatively adopted or approved affirmative action means more litigation as the only sure method of
establishing a constitutionally viable affirmative action program.
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desegregation is not individualized relief, limited to a few specific
victims of de jure school segregation. Rather, the constitutional
command of Brown was to dismantle the entire system of racially
segregated public education, district by district.
To that end, the Supreme Court in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education5 authorized a variety of raceconscious, affirmative measures to achieve school desegregationincluding the busing of students by race-in order to attain a "racial
balance" of students throughout the school district, in accordance
with a court-specified numeric ratio. The historic and ongoing process of school desegregation is plainly inconsistent with assertions by
members of the present Court that the Fourteenth Amendment is
"colorblind" and forbids the use of race-conscious, group-based affirmative action to remedy systemic discrimination," propositions
which the Court expressly rejected as recently as its 1980 decision in
Fullilove v. Klutznick:87
As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the
remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly "colorblind" fashion. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, we rejected this argument in considering a
court-formulated school desegregation remedy. . . . In
McDaniel v. Barresi, citing Swann, we observed: "In this remedial process, steps will almost invariably require that
students be assigned 'differently because of their race.'
Any other approach would freeze the status quo that is the
very target of all desegregation processes." And in North
CarolinaBoard of Education v. Swann, we invalidated a state
law that absolutely forbade assignment of any student on
account of race because it foreclosed implementation of desegregation plans that were designed to remedy
constitutional violations. We held that "[jiust as the race of
students must be considered in determining whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be
considered in formulating a remedy."''
Nothing under the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the use of
race-conscious remedies to the judicial branch or requires judicial
findings of constitutional violations as a predicate for government's
voluntary use of race-conscious remedies.89 As the Court noted in

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
See Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at 1755-56.
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Id. at 482 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966).
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Fullilove, the remedial legislative powers of Congress are much
broader than those of the Court.90 Both the legislative and executive
branches of government may undertake voluntary affirmative action, though strict scrutiny requires a "strong basis" in evidence for
believing that discrimination has occurred and that remedial action
is necessary.91
D. Strict Scrutiny Frustratesthe Remedial Objectives
of the FourteenthAmendment
Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court subjected all legislation to a
single standard of traditional, or rational basis, review. Traditional
review applied
92 also to racial classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. However, in footnote 4 of his opinion for the Court in
United States v. CaroleneProducts Co., Justice Stone advanced the idea
of "more searching judicial inquiry" for certain kinds of legislation.93

90.
[T]he power of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and
state governmental entities is not plenary.... [A] federal court is required to
tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the nature and extent of the ...
violation....
Here we deal . . . not with the limited remedial powers of a federal
court,.., but with the broad remedial powers of Congress. It is fundamental
that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more
comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483.
91. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
92. For example, the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson held:
[E]very exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend only to
such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good,
and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class....
So far, then, as a conflict with the 14th Amendment is concerned, the
case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large
discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of
their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.
Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even
requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable.
163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
93. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). In analyzing Footnote 4, one commentator has
observed that:
Justice Stone . . . found normative justification for judicial review in the
failure of legislative process. The normal presumption of constitutionality to
which legislation was entitled possibly was inappropriate, Justice Stone
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A presumption of constitutionality, he wrote, should no longer extend to laws falling "within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution," or where "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" tended "to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily.., relied upon to protect minorities."9
Footnote 4 was the genesis of the Court's modern three-tiered
approach to equal protection analysis, 9s an approach that uses rational, intermediate, or strict scrutiny in reviewing government
action or legislation, depending on the classifications used or the
nature of the individual rights affected. When racial classifications
are viewed as "suspect," the highest level of scrutiny would normally apply.
But did Footnote 4 contemplate a "more searching judicial inquiry" for all uses of racial classifications or for only those that
disadvantaged "discrete and insular minorities"? Given the premise
upon which Footnote 4 is based-the abuse of the political process to
the disadvantage of minorities-would the same level of scrutiny
apply to special programs adopted by the majority 96for the specific
benefit of disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities?
postulated, not only when specific provisions of the Bill of Rights were
plainly controverted, but also in situations where the ordinary operations of
majoritarian institutions were distorted by artificial constraints on full
political participation.
Klarman, supra note 13, at 219. Under this view, strict scrutiny applies only where
the political process violates fundamental rights, or the rights and interests of
"discrete and insular minorities." In other words, strict scrutiny is not triggered
merely by the use of a racial classification. Nor should it be. With the eventual demise of "separate but equal," government discrimination on the basis of race became
irrational per se-i.e., invidious discrimination by law fails even rational basis review. On the other hand, the use of race- or gender-conscious remedies to end
systemic discrimination against minorities and women is rational as well as necessary. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
94. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. In denying the presumption of validity to laws disadvantaging discrete and insular minorities, the Court was not
applying a presumption of invalidity. The point was that the law would not receive
the usual deference, and would be more closely scrutinized in balancing the competing interests of discrete and insular minorities and the government. As discussed
below, strict scrutiny's "presumption of invalidity" interjects an unnecessary and
artificial evidentiary requirement in analyzing race-conscious affirmative action.
95. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087,
1087-89 (1982) ("Carolene Products retains its fascination solely because of Footnote
4-the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.... This footnote now is recognized as a primary source of 'strict scrutiny' judicial review. Indeed, many
scholars think it actually commenced a new era in constitutional law.").
96. The language of Footnote 4 suggests there would be no need for a "more
searching judicial inquiry" if "discrete and insular minorities" suffer no disadvantage
from the ordinary operation of the political process. Justice Powell explains:
The footnote.., is thought to have provided its own theoretical justification. The theory properly extracted from Footnote 4 . . . is roughly as
follows: The findamental character of our government is democratic. Our
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The Supreme Court first considered the question in Regents of
the University of Californiav. Bakke.9 In Bakke, the Court struck down a
special medical school admissions program that reserved sixteen of
one hundred seats for minority applicants only. A key question in
the case was the level of judicial scrutiny to apply. 98 Justice Powell,
in a lone opinion announcing the judgment of the Cohrt," rejected
the University's argument under Carolene Products that White males
are not a "discrete and insular minority" requiring extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process. He responded:
This rationale ... has never been invoked in our decisions

as a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions
to strict scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness
and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a
holding that a particular classification is invidious.... Racial and ethnic classifications . . . are subject to stringent
examination without regard to these additional characteristics....

constitution assumes that majorities should rule and that the government
should be able to govern. Therefore, for the most part, Congress and the state
legislatures should be allowed to do as they choose. But there are certain
groups that cannot participate effectively in the political process. And the
political process therefore cannot be trusted to protect these groups in the
way it protects most of us. Consistent with these premises, the theory continues, the Supreme Court has two special missions in our scheme of
government: First, to clear away impediments to participation, and ensure
that all groups can engage equally in the political process; and [s]econd, to
review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to discrete and insular
minorities who are unable to protect themselves in the legislative process.
I do not embrace this theory one hundred percent; nor do I condemn it.
Id. at 1088-89 (emphasis added).
97. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
98.
The parties ... disagree as to the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to the
special admissions program. Petitioner [the University] argues that the court
below erred in applying strict scrutiny.... That level of review, petitioner asserts, should be reserved for classifications that disadvantage "discrete and
insular minorities." Respondent [Bakke], on the other hand, contends that the
California [Supreme Clourt correctly rejected the notion that the degree of
judicial scrutiny accorded a particular racial or ethnic classification hinges on
membership in a discrete and insular minority, and duly recognized that the
"rights established [by the Fourteenth Amendment] are personal rights."
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-88 (Powell, J.) (citation omitted).
99. Justice Stevens--joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist-concurred in the judgment on statutory grounds, finding that the special
admissions programs violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,
which prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at
412-13. Since Justice Stevens did not reach the constitutional question, he expressed
no view on the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied. See id. at 411-12, 421.
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... Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination.' °

However, in referring to "discrete and insular minorities" in
Carolene Products, Justice Stone quite clearly had racial, ethnic, national, and religious minorities in mind. 1 1 One commentator
explained:
"Discrete and insular" minorities are not simply losers in
the political arena, they are perpetual losers. Indeed, to say
they lose in the majoritarian political process is seriously to
distort the facts: they are scapegoats in the real political
struggles between other groups. Moreover, in their
"insularity" such groups may be characteristically helpless,
passive victims of the political process. It is, therefore, because of the discreteness and insularity of certain
minorities (objects of prejudice) that we cannot trust "the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities." A more searching judicial
scrutiny is thus superimposed upon the structural protections against "factions" relied on by the original
Constitution-the diffusion of political power and checks
and balances. 1°'
It is not the use of a racial classification itself that triggers strict
scrutiny under Footnote 4. Rather, it is the underlying abuse of the
political process to the detriment of a discrete and insular minority
that triggers heightened review.
As a consequence, Powell's above-quoted response in Bakke was
clearly at variance with the underlying premise of Footnote 4-i.e.,
that unlike non-minorities, "discrete and insular minorities" are at a
distinct disadvantage in the political process and, for that very rea-

100. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91.
101. See Cover, supra note 26, at 1298 ("[B]y the 1930's, 'minorities' in the footnote
four sense was already an accepted term of art with a recognized technical meaning

in international law.").
102. Id. at 1294-97. By contrast, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part):
[W]hites as a class [do not] have any of the traditional indicia of suspectness:
the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.
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son, require special protection from the Court. In other words, minorities and non-minorities are not "similarly situated" in the
political process. Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause does not
require that they be treated the same when remedying defects in a
political process. 0' To reject that distinction, as Justice Powell did, is
to reject the very premise upon which Footnote 4 is grounded.
Under Footnote 4, therefore, race- or gender-conscious affirmative action programs receive traditional or less-than-strict review,
since they do not violate the fundamental rights of individual White
males,'5 or result from a defect in the democratic process

103. In a Columbia Law School address several years later, Justice Powell made
the following observations about Footnote 4 and its author:
[In one sense, any group that loses a legislative battle can be regarded as
both "discrete" and "insular."... But, as the cases cited make clear, these are
not the types of groups that Stone had in mind.
* * Stone referred to discrete and insular minorities in a sentence, divided by a colon, in which he had referred earlier to racial, ethnic, and
religious groups. Examining the textual evidence only, I think it would be a
plausible reading that these are the only kinds of groups to which the term
"discrete and insular" was intended to refer. In the normal operation of the
political process, the term then would suggest that some racial, religious, and
ethnic groups are not treated fairly and equally. Courts therefore should apply strict scrutiny to laws "directed at" these disadvantaged groups.
Powell, supra note 95, at 1090-91. Despite its "intuitive appeal," Powell could not
accept the underlying premise of Footnote 4 as constitutional doctrine. He maintained that in our heterogeneous democracy, "there inevitably are both winners and
losers." Id. at 1091. A former law clerk to Justice Stone refers to Powell's reading of
Footnote 4 as "another doubtful interpretation of 'discrete and insular.' " See Louis
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1093,
1105 n.72 (1982).
104. Heightened scrutiny applies only when a racial classification invidiously discriminates against racial minorities. For as Justice Stewart put it:
The Constitution is violated when government, state or federal, invidiously classifies similarly situated people on the basis of the immutable
characteristics with which they were born....
Thus, detrimental racial classifications by government always violate
the Constitution, for the simple reason that, so far as the Constitution is concerned, people of different races are always similarly situated.
Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 477 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
105. The Supreme Court has held that there is no fundamental right to government employment. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976). The Court has not recognized any fundamental right to higher education or in
the awarding of government contracts-all subjects of traditional affirmative action
programs. Thus, individual White males cannot claim violation of their fundamental
rights under most affirmative action programs. Instead, they can only claim that it is
the consideration of race itself that presumptively violates the Equal Protection
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disadvantaging a discrete and insular minority. Consequently,
"heightened" or strict scrutiny is not triggered.
Justice Powell also misapprehended the Court's role in reviewing legislation employing racial classifications, as contemplated by
Footnote 4. In his Columbia Law School address, Powell charged:
Footnote 4, as interpreted by many commentators, represented a radical departure of its own. Far from initiating a
jurisprudence of judicial deference to political judgments
by the legislature, Footnote 4-on this view-undertook to
substitute one activist judicial missionfor another [i.e., Lochnerism].... Where the Court before had used the substantive
due process clause to protect property rights, now it
should use the equal protection clause... as a sword with
which to promote the libert,0 interests of groups disadvantaged by political decisions.
But in fact, Footnote 4 calls for less "judicial activism" than the strict
scrutiny Powell advocated. Under Footnote 4, heightened review
applies only to legislation that is "inimical" to the interests of discrete and insular minorities. All other government uses of racial
classifications would receive at most "searching," but less-than-strict
review.
Compare, for example, the searching, but less-than-strict review
applied by Chief Justice Burger in Fullilove:
A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a
remedial context, calls for close examination; yet we are
bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to
the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to "provide for the.., general Welfare
of the United States" and "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment....

Our analysis proceeds in two steps. At the outset, we
must inquire whether the objectives of this legislation are
within the power of Congress. If so, we must go on to decide whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria...
is a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the
congressional objectives and does not violate the equal

Clause and triggers strict scrutiny-the very propositions that are being questioned
in this Article.
106. Powell, supra note 95, at 1089-90 (emphasis added).
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protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.'0
Finding that Congress had exercised "an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers" in enacting the ten percent minority-owned
business set-aside requirement under the 1977 Public Works Employment Act, the Court "reject[ed] the contention that in the
remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind'
fashion."'' 8 Furthermore, Burger explained, "In dealing with this facial challenge to the statute, doubts must be resolved in support of the
congressionaljudgment,"' 9 rather than presuming against that judg-

ment as is now required by Adarand. Burger noted that "after due
consideration," Congress "perceived a pressing need to move forward with new approaches in the continuing effort to achieve the
goal of equality of economic opportunity. In this effort, Congress has
necessary latitude to try new techniques such as the limited use of
racial and ethnic criteria to accomplish remedial objectives.""0
Chief Justice Burger noted that "when such a program comes
under judicial review, courts must be satisfied that the legislative
objectives and projected administration give reasonable assurance
that the program will function within constitutional limitations."'
Thus, "any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does
not conflict with constitutional guarantees."" 2 However, Burger also
made it clear that "a most searching examination" did not mean
strict scrutiny: "This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or
implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke.""'
Finally, under Footnote 4, the Court's role in "correcting defects
of process" is limited to heightened review of legislation resulting
from such defects. The fashioning of structural remedies to correct
"defects of process" is left to the political branches of governmentfor example, enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act 4 and raceconscious remedies authorized under it.

107. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73 (1980) (emphasis omitted)
(citation omitted).

108. Id. at 482.
109. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 490.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 492. The "formulas of analysis articulated" would include strict scrutiny
(per Justice Powell) and intermediate scrutiny (per Justice Brennan).
114. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
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In strictly scrutinizing all uses of racial classifications, the Supreme Court has lost sight of the central concern underlying
Footnote 4-not the use of racial classifications per se, but the
checking of defects in the democratic process that disadvantage discrete and insular minorities.
E. The Court's Adoption of Strict Scrutiny and Its Presumption
of Race-Neutral Equality
Since there was no majority holding, Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke left unresolved the issue of whether strict or intermediate scrutiny applied to race-based affirmative action.1 ' In
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., however, the majority formally
severed the link between Footnote 4 and the special protection it afforded "discrete and insular minorities":
If one aspect of the judiciary's role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect "discrete and insular minorities"
from majoritarian prejudice or indifference, some maintain
that these concerns are not implicated when the "white
majority" places burdens upon itself. In this case, blacks
constitute approximately 50% of the population of the city
of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are
held by blacks. The concern that a political majority will

115. In 1980-two years after Bakke-the Court applied less-than-strict review in
upholding the 10% minority-owned business contracting requirement under the
federal Public Works Employment Act of 1977. See supra text accompanying notes
107-13 (discussing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)). Indeed, Justice
O'Connor in Croson acknowledged this use of less stringent review:
The principal opinion in Fullilove, written by Chief Justice Burger, did not
employ "strict scrutiny" or any other traditional standard of equal protection
review. The Chief Justice noted at the outset that although racial classifications call for close examination, the Court was at the same time "bound to
approach [its] task with appropriate deference to the Congress."
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487 (1989). However, the Croson
Court refused to apply that less stringent standard in reviewing state-sponsored
affirmative action programs, the majority of which had been adopted in response to
Fullilove. See id.
Finally, in deciding that the same standard should apply to federal and state
programs, Adarand effectively overruled Fullilove: "Of course it follows that to the
extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less
rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995). Unfortunately, the Court overruled the wrong case. A
judicially conservative Court would have overruled Croson, opting instead for Fullilove's deferential, but "searching," examination of both state and federal affirmative
action. Only a politically conservative and judicially "activist" Court would go the
other way. Cf. Glennon, supra note 13 (distinguishing between judicial conservatism
and political conservatism).
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more easily act to the disadvantage of a [political] minority
...would

seem to militate for, not against, the application

of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case." 6
Here, too, Justice O'Connor departs from the basic premise of Footof heightened scrutiny to White
note 4 by extending the protection
7
males as a politicalminority."
In making strict scrutiny applicable to all racial classifications,
regardless of purpose, the Croson majority rejected Footnote 4's fundamental premise of historic and actual inequality in the political
process for discrete and insular minorities. Instead, the majority
adopted a legal and philosophical presumption of "race-neutral" or
"colorblind" equality.
For all its legal and philosophical assumptions, however, the
Croson majority was no closer to knowing the actual facts about racial discrimination in Richmond's construction industry than it was
at the time it noted probable jurisdiction in the case. Most of the evidence relied on by the Richmond city council was discounted or
ignored by the Court on questionable grounds and under a retroactive application of strict scrutiny that the Court was then in the
process of adopting. The result was dictated by the Court's mechanical application of strict scrutiny, and not by a considered
weighing of the evidence presented in the record or by appropriate
deference to the legislative factfinding of the city council.
Croson involved far more than the validity of Richmond's program. Ultimately, the case has been about the ability of state and
local governments to formulate effective policies in addressing a
problem that predates the U.S. Constitution, a problem that will not
disappear on the basis of legal or philosophical assumptions. The
lower courts, however, have had to apply Croson's "color-blind

116. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (citations omitted). But see Klarman, supra note 11,
at 314 ("[Wlhile whites possibly constituted a slight minority of Richmond's population, they enjoyed a secure majority in the state of Virginia, which could amply
defend their interests by restricting, or even banning, local affirmative action
plans."). Like Klarman, Michel Rosenfeld also found O'Connor's opinion in Croson
to be problematic:
Justice O'Connor's conclusion is erroneous, however, for two principal rea-

sons: first, the analogy she draws is not supported by the facts; and second,
more importantly, even if it were, it would be valid only at a purely abstract

and superficial level.
•..[Tihere is no justification for simply equating that vote with that of
an overwhelmingly white legislature acting to disadvantage a group of blacks

which is unmistakably in the minority.
Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at 1774-75, 1777.
117. Even Justice Powell recognized that Footnote 4's reference to "discrete and

insular minorities" did not include politicalminorities. See discussion supra note 103.
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equal protection jurisprudence" in a wide range of remedial contexts
involving employment, higher education, legislative redistricting,
and public contracting. The results have been erratic and inconsistent, due in large measure to the Supreme Court's own ambivalence
and incoherence in strictly scrutinizing affirmative action.
Even assuming constitutional limits on the use of raceconscious affirmative action, the Court's "colorblind" jurisprudence
has only served to frustrate the central remedial objectives of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
F. Crossing the ConstitutionalDivide
In Lochner v. New York," 8 the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute limiting the number of hours employees could work in bakeries. The Court found the regulation to be a "meddlesome
interference[]" with liberty of contract, as guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Liberty of Contract,"9 Roscoe Pound wrote that in reaching the result in Lochner, the
Court had ignored the legislative record and had made improper
assumptions about "equality of rights" between employers and employees in the marketplace.'O "Why," Pound queried, do courts
insist on testing social and economic legislation against an
"academic theory of equality in the face of practical conditions of
inequality"? 2 ' Legal systems, he continued, go through periods of
decay in which "scientific jurisprudence becomes mechanical jurisprudence," where concepts become "fixed," where premises are no
longer examined and where principles cease to be important.u The
law, in short, becomes a body of rules under which "social progress
[is] barred by barricades of dead precedents."' 2'
Chief Justice Burger echoed those same warnings in Fullilove:

118.
119.
120.
121.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract,18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
See id. at 480.
Id. at 454. Pound further observes:

The court is driven to deal with the problem artificially or not at all, unless it
is willing to assume that the legislature did its duty and to keep its hands off
on that ground. More than anything else, ignorance of the actual situations of
fact for which legislation was provided and supposed lack of legal warrant
for knowing them, have been responsible for the judicial overthrowing of so
much social legislation.

Id.
122. See id., at 462.

123. Id.
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Petitioners have mounted a facial challenge to a program developed by the politically responsive branches of
Government.... [A]s Mr. Justice Jackson admonished in a
different context in 1941:
The Supreme Court can maintain itself and succeed
in its tasks only if the counsels of self-restraint urged
most earnestly by members of the Court itself are
humbly and faithfully heeded. After the forces of
conservatism and liberalism, of radicalism and reaction, of emotion and of self-interest are all caught up
in the legislative process and averaged and come to
rest in some compromise measure ... or some other
legislative policy, a decision striking it down closes
an area of compromise in which conflicts have actually, if only temporarily, been composed. Each
such decision takes away from our democratic federalism another of its defenses against domestic
disorder and violence. The vice of judicial supremacy, as exerted for ninety years in the field of policy,
has been its'progressive closing of the avenues to
peaceful and democratic conciliation of our social
and economic conflicts.

In a different context to be sure,... Mr. Justice Brandeis had this to say:
To stay experimentation in things social and
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right
to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.14
In departing from well-settled principles of judicial restraint in
matters affecting social and economic policy, the Croson majority
made academic and unsupportable assumptions about racial equality, in the face of practical conditions of inequality. Indeed, central to
the holding in Croson is its rejection of congressional findings2 and
other evidence of discrimination in the construction industry as a

124. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,490-91 (1980) (citations omitted).
125. For a summary of the congressional findings supporting the 10% MBE setaside program, see City of Richmond v. I.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 530-34 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,041 app. at 26,050-54 (1996) (proposed May 23, 1996)
(outlining a preliminary survey to demonstrate a compelling interest for affirmative
action in federal procurement).
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relevant basis for voluntary remedial action by the Richmond city
council. Justice O'Connor noted:
While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this country has
contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a
rigid racial quota in the awarding of public contracts....
[A]n amorphous claim that there has been past discrimicannot justify the use of an
nation in a particular industry
16
unyielding racial quota. 1
Yet, Justice O'Connor concluded that that "sorry history" of discrimination could be given no evidentiary consideration by
Richmond. To the contrary, O'Connor wrote, "[The Richmond setaside] seems to rest on the unsupported assumption that white contractors simply will not hire minority firms.... There is no finding-and
we decline to assume-that male caucasian contractors will award
contracts only to other male caucasians."'27
In other words, Justice O'Connor applied an "academic" assumption of racial equality in the awarding of subcontracts, "in the
face of practical conditions of inequality." As the Justice Department
has noted: "[T]he discriminatory barriers facing minority-owned
businesses are not vague and amorphous manifestations of historical
societal discrimination. Rather, they are real and concrete, and reflect ongoing patterns and practices of exclusion, as well as the
tangible, lingering effects of prior discriminatory conduct."'2 Nevertheless, the courts today are constrained to apply a "mechanical
jurisprudence" of strict scrutiny, with the inevitable result that legitimate government policies to dismantle systemic discrimination
are routinely struck down.
"Societal discrimination" is, of course, the sum total of local discriminatory practices. 129 "The problem in Richmond was . . . both

126. 488 U.S. at 499.
127. Id. at 502.
128. Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed.
Reg. app. at 26,051.
129. As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in Croson:
[T]he majority downplays the fact that the city council had before it a rich
trove of evidence that discrimination in the Nation's construction industry
had seriously impaired the competitive position of businesses owned or
controlled by members of minority groups. It is only against this backdrop of
documented national discrimination, however, that the local evidence
adduced by Richmond can be properly understood. The majority's refusal to
recognize that Richmond has proved itself no exception to the dismaying
pattern of national exclusion which Congress so painstakingly identified
infects its entire analysis of this case.
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similar to, and part of, a much broader national problem."'' 3 Time and
again the observation has been made that the elimination of raceconscious affirmative action will lead to "resegregation" of our
workplaces, legislative bodies, 3 1 colleges and universities,3 and in
society generally'3-a process that will no doubt accelerate in response to Adarand,34 Shaw I,' 3' Bush v. Vera,'3' and lower court

... So long as one views Richmond's local evidence of discrimination
against the backdrop of systematic nationwide racial discrimination in this
very industry, this case is readily resolved.

488 U.S. at 530, 535.
130. Rosenfeld, supranote 12, at 1746.
131. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Voids Race-Based Plans for Redistricting:
Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996, at Al. She notes one such observation:
Laughlin McDonald, director of the southern regional office of the American
Civil Liberties Union, predicted the result would be the "bleaching of Congress" as well as state and local legislative bodies, as new districts drawn
across the South to increase minority representation fall under legal attack.
Id.
132.
If admissions conunittees were mandated to base their decisions solely on
grade point averages (GPAs) and standardized test scores, analyses indicate
that (with the exception of Asians) the complexion of selective higher education institutions, including medical schools, would return to that of the 1950s
(Association of American Medical Colleges, unpublished staff analysis, 1995).
... In our view, those who wish to see our country abandon affirmative action have given insufficient consideration to the severe damage that would
occur to our social structure if our slow movement toward racial and ethnic
equity were to be reversed.
...
[Tihe paradigm for affirmative action in both medicine and the corporate world is diversity; the diversity paradigm incorporates justice and
equity, but also recognizes that diversity is essential for quality improvement.
For medicine, this view acknowledges that eradicating the underrepresentation of minorities among medical students, house staff, faculty,
administrators, and researchers is essential if the medical profession is to
fulfill its obligations to society; diversity is a necessary condition for medicine
to provide culturally sensitive medical education, improve access to quality
health care for all Americans, and address important research questions affecting all segments of our society.

Herbert W. Nickens & Jordan J. Cohen, Policy Perspectives: On Affirmative Action, 275
JAMA 572,572-73 (1996).
133. See Jeffrey Rosen, Affirmative Action: A Solution, NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 1995,
at 20, 20 ("Color-blindness, for all its moral and political appeal, is not really a practical option. When asked point-blank, few conservatives are honestly willing to
accept the widespread resegregation that would follow from a rigid ban on racial
preferences.").
134. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
135. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
136. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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decisions such as Hopwood.3 7 Clearly, strict scrutiny of affirmative
action exceeds the proper role of the courts in our constitutional system.
II. STRICT SCRUTINY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: IS IT RATIONAL?
A. How Strict Is Strict?
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,' seven members of the
U.S. Supreme Court agreed that race-based affirmative action
programs are constitutional, provided they satisfy the test of strict
scrutiny.3 9 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor also declared,
"[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory,
but fatal in fact.' "'40 Despite the admonition, however, Adarand has
only intensified the debate over what strict scrutiny means and how
to apply it. As one observer notes: "[T]he Supreme Court has
essentially delegated the difficult responsibility of defining strict
scrutiny to a nationwide judiciary.... [T]he lower courts are sure to
take a variety of approaches in applying strict scrutiny and the
differences in these approaches ultimately will have to be resolved

137. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), reh 'g en banc denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
138. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
139. See id. at 2117. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy in Part Ill.D of her opinion. In separate concurrences, Justice Scalia
opined that government use of race-conscious remedies can never be justified under
the Constitution, see id. at 2118, while Justice Thomas expressed the view that
"government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice," see id. at 2119.
140. 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring)). But Justice O'Connor may be alone in that view. During
oral argument in the North Carolina and Texas congressional redistricting cases, the
attorney for the White North Carolina plaintiffs argued that once race was identified
as the motivating factor, the district must be struck down under strict scrutiny. The
following exchange then took place:
"So you take the position that once strict scrutiny is applied, it's fatal in fact,"
Justice O'Connor said.... Yes, Mr. Everett replied, it was his position that no
race-conscious districting could survive the hurdle of strict scrutiny.
Justice O'Connor said, "I had thought we had indicated it is possible to
survive strict scrutiny, but you're arguing for something else."
Mr. Everett replied, "I'm descending from the theoretical to the
practical."
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Court Hears Arguments on Race in Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at Bll. As a practical matter, many judges continue
to regard strict scrutiny as strict in theory, fatal in fact-i.e., they apply it as a per se
rule of invalidity.
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by the Supreme Court.'' Indeed, the lower courts have taken
divergent approaches to strict scrutiny. 42 The Supreme Court has
only added to the confusion in its most recent affirmative action
decisions in the voting rights context, Shaw v. Hunt' and Bush v.
Vera.'" In separate concurring opinions in those two cases, members
of the Court invalidated four majority-minority congressional
districts in North 5Carolina and Texas, under different formulations
of strict scrutiny.1
Building on the Court's prior decision in Miller v. Johnson,'"
Justice O'Connor explained in Bush v. Vera that strict scrutiny applies where race is a predominant factor in the drawing of
congressional districts:

141. Thomas J. Madden & Kevin M. Kordziel, Strict Scrutiny and the Future of Federal Procurement Set-Aside Programs in the Wake of Adarand: Does "Strict in Theory"
Mean "Fatal in Fact"?, 64 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 6 (Aug. 7, 1995), available in
WESTLAW, BNA-FCR Database.
142. See supra note 19 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood decision); see also
infra text accompanying notes 150-56 (comparing Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d
1155 (6th Cir. 1994) with Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1996)).
143. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
144. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
145. In Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor assumed Texas had a "compelling interest"
under the first prong of strict scrutiny in complying with § 2 of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act. However, because the three majority-minority districts were "bizarrely
shaped," "far from compact," and drawn primarily on the basis of race, she concluded they were not "narrowly tailored" under the second prong of strict scrutiny.
See 116 S.Ct. at 1961. Justice O'Connor rejected the State's argument that bizarreness
of shape and noncompactness were irrelevant to narrow tailoring, since they related
only to improper motive under the first prong of strict scrutiny. See id. at 1961-62.
She also rejected the federal government's argument that because "bizarreness and
noncompactness are necessary to achieve the State's compelling interest in compliance with § 2,... the narrowly tailoring requirement is satisfied." Id.
According to Justice O'Connor, "Significant deviations from traditional districting principles... cause constitutional harm insofar as they convey the message
is part of the
that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial .... [I]t
constitutional problem insofar as it disrupts nonracial bases of political identity and
thus intensifies the emphasis on race." Id. Accordingly, bizarrely shaped, noncompact districts are not sufficiently tailored.
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, felt constrained to disagree with
O'Connor's formulation of the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny:
In this respect, I disagree with the apparent suggestion in Justice O'Connor's
separate concurrence that a court should conduct a second predominantfactor inquiry in deciding whether a district was narrowly tailored ....There
is nothing in the plurality opinion or any opinion of the Court to support that
proposition. The simple question is whether the race-based districting was
reasonably necessary to serve a compelling interest.
Id. at 1972 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146. 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995) (invalidating a majority-minority congressional district
in Georgia).
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Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting
is performed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply
to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts .... For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must
prove that other, legitimate districting principles were
"subordinated" to race. By that, we mean that race must be
"the predominant factor motivating the legislature's
[redistricting] decision." We thus differ from Justice Thomas, who would apparently hold that it suffices that racial
considerations be a motivation
for the drawing of a major147
ity-minority district.
Does O'Connor mean, then, that the equal consideration of race as
one factor among others receives less than strict scrutiny, contrary to
Powell's opinion in Bakke? Moreover, how does one determine if
race has been the predominant consideration? Justice O'Connor reminds us that "[sitrict scrutiny remains . . . strict."'" Thus, it seems
that only the Court will know for sure how much a consideration of
race is too much. 49
The Court's ambivalence about the permissible use of raceconscious remedies has frustrated good-faith efforts by government
at all levels to investigate and voluntarily rectify both historic and
continuing problems of racial and gender discrimination. Many state
and local agencies that want to implement voluntary plans have no
clear, definitive guidance from the Court on what is required to satisfy strict scrutiny.

147. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (O'Connor, J.) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 1961. As one Court observer notes, "Like most contested issues of social
policy. . ., the future of... affirmative action... rests on the cryptic impulses of
Sandra Day O'Connor. Divining Justice O'Connor's wishes is never easy, least of all
for Justice O'Connor herself." Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died, NEw REPuBLIc,
Apr. 22, 1996, at 21, 24. "[I]n her tortured opinions in the voting rights cases,
O'Connor has said that government can be race-conscious, as long as it's not too
obvious about it." Id.
149. In her plurality opinion in Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that
"problems have arisen from the uncertainty in the law prior to and during its gradual clarification in Shaw I, Miller, and today's cases." She continued, however:
We are aware of the difficulties faced by the States, and by the district courts,
in confronting new constitutional precedents, and we also know that the nature of the expressive harms with which we are dealing, and the complexity
of the districting process are such that bright-line rules are not available. But
we believe that today's decisions ... will serve to clarify the States' responsibilities. The States have traditionally guarded their sovereign districting
prerogatives jealously, and we are confident that they can fulfill that requirement, leaving the courts to their customary and appropriate backstop
role.
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1964 (emphasis added).
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The lower courts as well are making the task ever more difficult. Consider, for example, two recent decisions from the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In Aiken v. City of Memphis, 5" White
police officers and firefighters challenged two affirmative action
promotion plans adopted by the city of Memphis, Tennessee. In its
opinion, the Sixth Circuit, en banc, summarized the prior histories of
discrimination in police and fire promotions, supporting its conclusion that "the race-based promotions at issue here were supported
However, the case was remanded for
by a 'compelling interest.' .....
further proceedings to determine if the plans were narrowly tailored. In explaining the test of strict scrutiny, the Aiken court said:
No formal finding of past discrimination by the governmental unit involved is necessary to determine that a
compelling interest exists, but there must be "strong" or
"convincing" evidence of past discrimination by that governmental unit.....
It is settled that "[aippropriate statistical evidence setting forth a prima facie case of discrimination is sufficient
to provide a strong basis in evidence to support a public
employer['s] affirmative action plan." . . . "[Aippropriate"
statistical evidence involves an examination of the racial,
composition of the qualified labor pool .... Whe[n] a gross
disparity exists between the expected percentage of minorities selected and the actual percentage of minorities
selected, then prima facie proof exists to demonstrate intentional discrimination in the selection of minorities to
those particular positions. Such prima facie proof presents
a strong basis in evidence to support a finding of a compelling governmental interest.
*.. [T]he City presented evidence of a wide disparity
between the percentage of black patrol officers and the
percentage of black sergeants in the Memphis Police Department .... Although such a disparity "is not conclusive
as to a finding of discrimination," the Aiken plaintiffs have
not offered any evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination that arises from these statistics.5 2
However, two years later, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit
struck down a similar affirmative action plan in Middleton v. City of

150. 37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 1994).
151. Id. at 1158.
152. Id. at 1162-63 (citations omitted) (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
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Flint,113 holding that "a disparity between the percentage of a protected class employed in a particular workforce or occupation and
the raw percentage of class members in a regional labor pool,
standing alone, cannot be 'a strong basis in evidence' sufficient to
justify hiring or promotion quotas.'" The panel said "it is permissible to remedy discrimination[, but i]t is not permissible to remedy
disparity,without more.' 5
In purporting to apply strict scrutiny, the Middleton panel rejected the use of statistically significant disparity studies as a basis
for voluntary affirmative action. Yet, in response to Croson, such
studies have served as the primary means of validating public-sector
affirmative action programs. 156

153. 92 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1996). Similar to the facts in Aiken, White police officers
in Flint, Michigan, also challenged an affirmative action plan requiring that a percentage (50%) of all promotions to sergeant be filled by minorities. See id. at 397.
Largely on the basis of a carefully drawn disparity study and in light of findings by
the Flint Human Relations Commission, the federal district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the City. See id. at 400-01. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding
that the City had failed to establish discrimination. See id. 406-09, 413.
While the Sixth Circuit panel in Middleton offered some criticisms of the disparity study conducted by the City's expert, its chief objections were to the expert's
"conclusory assumptions that have no basis in the law." Id. at 408. For example, the
panel noted that the expert "assumes without any substantiation whatsoever that
minority men and women as a group are exactly as inclined as are non-minority men
and women as a group-neither more so nor less so-to seek employment in the
police department, and that they are exactly as qualified under non-discriminatory
conditions." Id.
Of course, the panel itself assumes-with no basis in the record-that differences in inclination exist between qualified minorities and non-minorities in seeking
employment as police officers. Why should the court's unsupported assumption of
facts displace the conclusions of the Flint city council, which were based on an administrative investigation as well as on a valid and unrebutted disparity study? The
underlying issue was one of fact, not of law (i.e., was it more likely than not that the
noted disparity was the product of discrimination)? Under strict scrutiny, however,
lower court judges felt free to take certain liberties with the record and substitute
their view of the facts for the conclusions of politically accountable agencies.
154. Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d at 406 (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. This point is further corroborated by David Jung, Cyrus Wadia, and Murray
Haberman:
[W]hen Croson established that strict scrutiny applied, and required states to
justify their affirmative action programs with detailed proof of discrimination, a veritable "cottage industry" arose to provide the necessary evidence.
"Researchers retained by counties, municipalities and their agencies have
produced more than 100 studies detailing statistical disparities between the
amount of work awarded to minority businesses and the number of such
businesses available to do the work."
JUNG ET AL., supra note 2, at 7 (quoting Michael Gebhardt, Documenting Discrimina-

tion, S.F. RECORDER, July 14, 1995, at 1); see also Proposed Reforms to Affirmative
Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,041 app. at 26,061 (1996) (proposed
May 23, 1996) ("Under the rules established by the Supreme Court in its 1989 Croson
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B. Strict Scrutiny of Legislative Factfinding
In Croson, Justice O'Connor observed that "[tihe factfinding
process of legislative bodies is generally entitled to a resumption of
regularity and deferential review by the judiciary." However, as
she said in Adarand, when a legislative body employs a racial classification for remedial purposes, its proffered legal and factual
justifications must be strictly scrutinized. But why? In considering
legislation for the benefit of discrete and insular minorities, why
does political accountability not suffice as an adequate, if not a more
effective, check on legislative factfinding?
In cases challenging affirmative action plans aimed at remedying past discrimination, the case generally turns on whether prior
discrimination has been established and whether the proposed remedy is sufficiently tailored. If evidence is presented to a trial judge,
the court's findings will be overturned only if clearly erroneous.
That deferential standard, however, does not apply to the findings
of legislative or administrative bodies under strict scrutiny. If a legislative or administrative body finds prior discrimination, a
reviewing court will consider the sufficiency of the evidence as a
question of law. 9 In other words, it is not enough that reasonable
legislators were persuaded by evidence that there was prior .discrimination. The reviewing court wants to know if the evidence
would suffice to establish a prima facie case or would otherwise
satisfy the government's burden of production.
The difficulty with strict scrutiny does not lie in requiring
government agencies to amass sufficient evidence to support an
inference of discrimination. The problem lies in permitting the
courts de novo review of the same evidence, under the legal premise
that all government uses of racial classifications are suspect and
therefore presumptively invalid. Certainly, the Croson Court said that
"gross statistical disparities ... alone ... may constitute prima facie
decision,... [gross statistical] disparities can give rise to an inference of discrimination that can serve as the foundation of race-conscious remedial measures.").
157. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
158. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 91 F.3d 586, 596 (3d Cir. 1996)
(determining whether a strong basis in evidence by reviewing "the district court's

findings of fact for clear error").
159. See id. The court went on to state:
[Ulltimately, whether a strong basis in evidence of past or present discrimi-

nation exists, thereby establishing a compelling state interest .. .to enact a
race-conscious ordinance, is a question of law, "subject to plenary review."
The same is true of the issue of whether there is a strong basis in evidence for
concluding that the scope of the ordinance is narrowly tailored to remedy the

identified past or present discrimination.
Id. (quoting Concrete Works v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995)).
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proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination,"' and that such
disparities can provide a "strong basis in evidence for voluntary
affirmative action by the government.'. As a practical matter,
however, Croson invites de novo review of legislative or
administrative factfinding and judicial speculation as to possible
alternative, race-neutral "explanations" for statistical disparities.' 62
The courts have readily availed themselves of that approach in
rejecting the reasonable "inference" of discrimination that a
government agency might find in a disparity study."6 For example,
in Middleton v. City of Flint,the Sixth Circuit panel noted:
[TIhis court should be ever mindful that there could have
been and generally were numerous explanations for disparities between the percentage of minority and
nonminority police officers on the Saginaw police force,
many of them unrelated to discrimination of any kind ....

... [Furthermore jiust as "[tihere is no iron law of
human behavior that every racial or ethnic group will perform equally well on nonbiased examinations in all fields
of human endeavor," "it is common for different groups to
rely on different mobility ladders."'"
All too often, the courts lose sight of what should be the underlying
query-i.e., did the government have a reasonable basis in evidence for
concluding that a race-conscious remedy was necessary to correct
prior discrimination; not what the court concludes in reviewing the
same evidence, or what it believes may explain a statistical disparity.
Croson invites this kind of judicial speculation. As a result, courts are
now in a position to second-guess legislative and administrative
factfinding and to "explain away" statistical evidence of discrimination, no matter how valid the legislative or administrative study
may have been. Despite the technical distinctions between the burden of proof and the burden of production,' strict scrutiny makes it
far too easy for judges to simply substitute their own beliefs and factual conclusions for those of legislative and administrative
factfinders.
160. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501.
161. Id. at 510.
162. See id. at 503.
163. See, e.g., supra discussion accompanying notes 153-55 (discussing Middleton v.
City of Flint).
164. Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396,408 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
165. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987), and Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986).
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Legislative factfinding for purposes of formulating public policy is clearly different from judicial factfinding and its quest for the
truth in resolving competing legal claims between parties. Given the
differences of purpose, the Court never really explains why a legislative finding of prior systemic discrimination is any more suspect or
any less credible than a judicial finding. In Adarand, Justice
O'Connor posits that:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for
such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial"
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.
Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body
is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool.1 6
But where is the breakdown in the democratic process that necessitates this degree of intense judicial scrutiny? Is such scrutiny always
justified whenever the legislature uses a racial classification?
The Court has recognized at least two legitimate uses of racial
classifications that serve "compelling" government interests: 1)
remedying past discrimination and, in certain contexts, 2) improving
racial diversity so as to achieve other compelling governmental interests, such as enhancing the quality of higher education or making
law enforcement more effective. So if the government claims that it
is pursuing one of these objectives, is strict scrutiny still required?
In Croson, the Court said that "the mere recitation of a 'benign'
or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or
no weight."'6 7 Yet, the mere recitation of a legitimate objective appears
entirely consistent with the allocation of proof set out in Johnson v.
TransportationAgency:
The ultimate burden remains with the [plaintiff] to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action
program.... Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
that race or sex has been taken into account in the employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to the

166. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
167. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
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employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its
decision.'6

Since the mere articulation of a nondiscriminatory rationale-such
as the adoption of an affirmative action plan to remedy past discrimination 69-satisfies the government's burden of production
under Johnson, should it not also suffice to at least dispel the
"suspectness" or presumption of invalidity under strict scrutiny?' 70
Contrary to Johnson, however, many courts impose a heavy evidentiary burden on the government
because of strict scrutiny's
7
presumption of invalidity.1'

C. Unequal Protectionof the Laws
If a state legislature finds that disabled persons, women, and
Blacks have been discriminated against in public employment, is the
finding of discrimination against Blacks any more "suspect" than the
findings of discrimination against women and the disabled? Either
the discrimination exists or it does not. Why should the evidentiary
standards and degree of judicial scrutiny turn on the race, gender, or
physical abilities of the victim? Yet, clearly they do. An affirmative
action program for the disabled is more readily upheld under rational review, as compared to similar programs for women under
intermediate scrutiny and to those for racial minorities under strict
scrutiny. Such a result is hardly consistent with the idea that all

168. 480 U.S. at 626 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78

(1986)).
169. See id.
170. In discussing the allocation of proof laid down in Wygant, the Court in Johnson noted that the rules were the same for both constitutional challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment and statutory challenges under Title VII. 480 U.S. at 626.
171. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 91 F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir. 1996).
There, the court held:
[W]hen ... race-based classifications of an affirmative action plan are challenged, the proponents of the plan have the burden of coming forward with
evidence providing a firm basis for inferring that the legislatively identified
discrimination in fact exists or existed and that the race based classifications
are necessary to remedy the effects of the identified discrimination.
Id. This is more than a mere articulation requirement. Indeed, it goes beyond proving
a prima facie case based, for example, on "gross statistical disparities," as approved
in Croson, 488 U.S. at 501. Under the 1996 Contractors Association decision, the government carries the burden of persuasion.
172. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993). In this
earlier ContractorsAssociation decision, the district court had invalidated each aspect
of the City's "disadvantaged business enterprises" contracting program-covering
the disabled, women, and racial minorities-under three different standards of review. See id. at 995. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part,
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"persons" should receive the equal protection of the laws, including
affirmative relief from systemic discrimination.
As the Court recently observed in Romer v. Evans, "A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself 7a
denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."'
Persons who are denied opportunities on the basis of race suffer no
less injury than persons denied the same opportunities on the basis
of physical or mental disabilities. The use of different judicial standards for reviewing affirmative action programs makes it more
difficult for racial or ethnic groups than for other victims of discrimination to seek aid from the government.
The use of different judicial standards in reviewing both legislative findings of discrimination and legislatively approved
remedies also violates "equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." Clearly, as a matter of sound social policy, the legislative
and executive branches have equally compelling interests in eradicating systemic discrimination against all groups who have suffered
past and continuing discrimination.
D. Equating Benign and Invidious Discrimination
Supporters of affirmative action have long argued that strict
scrutiny should not apply to the "benign" or remedial use of racial
classifications. Justice Marshall observed in Croson:
Today, for the first time, a majority of this Court has
adopted strict scrutiny as the standard of Equal Protection
Clause review of race-conscious remedial measures. This is
an unwelcome development. A profound difference separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and
governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of
prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental activity
from perpetuating the effects of such racism .... "Because
vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appellate court agreed that
different standards of review applied to the three categories of disadvantaged businesses. See id. at 999.
In affirming rational basis review for the disabled, the court specifically noted
that "application of heightened scrutiny to the preference for handicapped business
owners would run counter to the [American with Disabilities Act], which Congress

enacted to reduce discrimination against handicapped persons." Id. at 1001. The
court did not explain, however, why Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act failed to
provide a similar justification for relaxed scrutiny of the gender and racial classifications under the program. The appellate court's only justification for imposing strict
scrutiny on the "racial and ethnic preferences" under the program was that Croson
required it. See id. at 1001-02.
173. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
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the consideration of race is relevant to remedying the continuing effects of past discrimination, and because
governmental programs employing racial classifications
for remedial purposes can be crafted to avoid stigmatization,

.

.

.

such programs should not be subjected to

conventional 'strict scrutiny'-scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 74
In his Adarand dissent, Justice Stevens agreed, arguing that "Itihere
is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination."' 7
However, Justice Marshall's successor on the Court, Justice
Clarence Thomas, sharply disagreed with Justice Stevens:
I write separately.., to express my disagreement with the
premise underlying Justice Stevens' and Justice Ginsburg's
dissents: that there is a racial paternalism exception to the
principle of equal protection. I believe there is a "moral
[and] constitutional equivalence" . . . between laws de-

signed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits
on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion
of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only
recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law.
...[R]acial paternalism and its unintended consequences

can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of
discrimination. So-called "benign" discrimination teaches
many that because of chronic and apparently immutable
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without
their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs
engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke
resentment among those who believe that they have been
wronged by the government's use of race. These programs

174. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (citations omitted).
175. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens went on to state:
The Court[] ...assumes that there is no significant difference between a decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the members of a
minority race and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain
members of that minority ....Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of
the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a
desire to foster equality in society. No sensible conception of the Government's constitutional obligation to "govern impartially," ... should ignore
this distinction.
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stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause
them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that
they are "entitled" to preferences." 6
For Justice Thomas, any remedial use of race-conscious remedies is
morally reprehensible and a violation of the colorblind principle that
"government may not make distinctions on the basis of race."
However, different standards of review should apply to
"benign" as opposed to "invidious" uses of race not only because the
"burdened" and the "benefited" may be treated differently, but more
importantly because the underlying judicial inquiries are fundamentally different. If the government first articulates a legitimate
compelling interest in race-conscious relief, the affirmative action
plan is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of validity. The presumption can be rebutted if the party challenging the plan can prove
"pretext" or some other impermissible government purpose-i.e.,
the Court should impose the same evidentiary burden on opponents
of affirmative action that it imposes on all other civil rights plaintiffs
who challenge government action.
E. Restricting the Government's Choice of Means
It is somewhat puzzling that the Court is quick to suspect the
government's motives when it openly employs race-conscious

176. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
177. Id. In complete disregard of this nation's history of race relations and of the
very circumstances that led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice

Thomas opines:
There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of
this [affirmative action] program is at war with the principle of inherent

equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. See Declaration of Independence ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created

equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.").
Id. Justice Thomas' concurring opinion is notable because of its rejection of affirmative action as bad social policy. Rarely, however, has the Court invalidated social and

economic legislation because it was "paternalistic," or because it "engenders attitudes" of superiority, inferiority or resentment. Indeed, the Court upheld social
security legislation in the late 1930s, despite such characterizations:
A system of old age pensions has special dangers of its own .... The existence of such a system is a bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere,
encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose....
Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of benefits ...
[under the Act], it is not for us to say.... Our concern here, as often, is with
power, not with wisdom.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).
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remedies, but is far less inclined to question those motives when
"facially neutral" means are used and the government simply articulates a race-neutral basis for discriminatory conduct.17 1 It seems as
though the Court is more concerned about the appearance of discrimination, rather than the reality.'7
Even if the government establishes its compelling interest in
race-conscious affirmative action, its program still may be voided
under the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. Once
again, courts may freely veto the government's choice of means on
the theory that racially neutral, less burdensome means could have
been used. But assuming a compelling interest in eliminating systemic discrimination, what is the justification for so severely
restricting the government's choice of means?
The Supreme Court's requirement of narrow tailoring appears
to rest on the colorblind premises that: 1) race is an irrelevant criterion that should rarely be used by government, and 2) the Equal
Protection Clause protects individual, rather than group rights.'o
Given these assumptions, even a compelling government interest in
race-conscious, group-based relief is viewed as subordinate to the
rights of "innocent" individuals bearing the burden of the remedy."'
But those assumptions betray a myopic view of the rights and
the interests involved. Reduced to its essence, the question is
whether the "innocent victims" of affirmative action have, in fact, an

178. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991) (addressing peremptory
challenges).

179. Cf. Rosen, supra note 148, at 24 ("... O'Connor has said that government can
be race-conscious, as long as it's not too obvious about it.").
180.
[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons,
not groups. It follows from that principle that all governmental action based
on race-a group classification long recognized as "in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited"-should be subjected to detailed judicial
inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has
not been infringed.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
181. In Wygant, the Court stated:
Article XII [of the contract is] a political compromise that "avoided placing
the entire burden of layoffs on either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a group." But the petitioners before us today are not "the
white teachers as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals
who claim they were fired from their jobs because of their race. .... The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distributed like bloc
grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does, petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners' rights.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281 n.8 (1986) (citation omitted). It
appears that Wendy Wygant was as much a victim of her "more senior . . . colleagues" as she was of her race.
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overriding, constitutionally protected right to benefits from a system
that discriminates or that perpetuates the effects of discrimination.
Strict scrutiny operates on the premise that they do. 8 2 Eliminating
systemic discrimination, however, necessarily means denying
"innocent" persons the benefits of discrimination.
At bottom, the Court's only arguable rationale for severely restricting the government's choice of remedial means is its insistence
on colorblindness, which-as we have seen-is neither mandated by
the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor by the half-century of
equal protection jurisprudence that preceded Croson. In short, if
eliminating systemic discrimination is a compelling government interest, there is no justification for severely narrowing the
government's choice of means, beyond the Court's arbitrary adoption of strict scrutiny as the test for race-conscious affirmative action.
CONCLUSION
In adopting strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard of review for government-adopted affirmative action, the Supreme Court
has taken onto itself ultimate responsibility and accountability for
the success or failure of ending systemic discrimination in this country. It is that very kind of public policy control which the Court has
studiously avoided throughout most of its history. And yet, an activist majority on the present Court appears determined to oversee race
relations in this country with little more than a judicial declaration
that government must be "colorblind," even though the rest of the
nation is not. Moreover, as I have attempted to demonstrate, the
Court's theoretical justifications for requiring strict scrutiny of affirmative action are seriously flawed.
The Supreme Court should begin anew-starting with Chief
Justice Burger's predicate in Fullilove: "As a threshold matter, we
reject the contention that in the remedial context . . .[government]
'
must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion. 8

182. See supra note 22.
183. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482 (1980).

